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1 Introduction
Why fewer women than men do market work? Why Koreans or Americans work longer hours
than Europeans? Ask a sociologist and she will likely point to cultural heterogeneity as the
main explanation of these di¤erences. While recognizing the importance of culture, economists
tend to understand better explanations based on opportunity costs or incentives and try to
avoid those involving di¤erences in preferences (of which we tend to be suspicious at least since
Stigler and Becker, 1977). One problem with di¤erences in preferences is that, although tastes
are clearly heterogeneous across individuals, it is hard to understand why a specic preference
should be more frequent among individuals living in a particular country or belonging to a
particular group. However, Fernández (2010) surveys a number of papers that provide ample
cross-sectional, historical and experimental evidence that this is indeed the case.
Our understanding is that culture shapes individual preferences (and, therefore, it should not
be surprising to nd group or geographical clustering of preferences), but this begets the question
of what gave rise to that particular culture in the rst place. We propose an explanation in
which it is economic factors (more specically, technology) that generate a culture that, in turn,
shapes the individual preferences. Culture, thus, determines through preferences the short run
equilibrium values of economic variables. In the long run, however, it is culture what changes
in response to the underlying economic fundamentals.
Previous e¤orts to understand the origin of preferences have stressed the central role that
exposure and experience play in the development of tastes.1 Of course, the notion that pref-
erences are shaped by habit and custom is not new in Economics, as it can be traced back at
least to Marshall (1920). In this origin-of-preferences literature, two strands can be identied,
that of external and that of internal habits.We use external habits to denote the idea
that it is unintended exposure to a given good or service what helps the individual to develop
a taste (or aversion) to it. It is conventional to cite Duesenberry (1949) as the precursor of
this habit formation theory that adopted its canonical form under Constantinides (1990) and
Abel (1990), and was latter extended to allow for intergenerational interactions by de la Croix
(1996). In a similar vein, internal habitsrefers to those cases in which it is the current choices
of the individual what shape her future preferences, because learning by consuming takes place.
This literature originated in Stigler and Becker (1977) and was later developed by Becker and
Murphy (1988).
As far as what the ultimate origin of preferences is, this habitstheory is wanting because
the preferences of an individual end up being explained, at least partially, by the preferences of
other people, and this naturally elicits the question of what is the origin of these other peoples
1See Bowles (1998) for evidence taken from other disciplines on the relevance of exposure in the development
of tastes.
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preferences. We believe that searching for the origin of preferences in preferences themselves is,
to some extent, tautological and we need to look at other fundamentals if we want to understand
their genesis. We share the view of Bowles (1998) that some basic preferences might be innate,
possibly genetically transmitted, while the rest would be learned. Those innate would be very
general in nature, such as the preference for sweet tastes or the dislike of pain, and probably are
the result of the gene selection process in the evolution of the species.2 The real problem lies in
understanding why a particular culture arises in which we learn to appreciate specic qualities
of the goods.
We posit that this is governed by endowments and technology, or, more precisely, by their
interaction. For example, if we look at sh and seafood consumption per capita, we observe that
it is highest in tiny Pacic island nations and lowest in some landlocked countries. Using country
data, the correlation coe¢ cient between sh and seafood consumption per year per capita and
the ratio of coastline length to total land area is of 0,66 with a t-statistic of 8,64. Even excluding
Maldives, whose exceptionally large per capita consumption may be driven by tourism, the
correlation coe¢ cient remains substantial with a value of 0,47 (6,09).3 A plausible rationale is
that, where sh was readily available, individuals developed a taste for sh, something that did
not happen where it was not, and this cultural preference is driving consumption decisions
today, when improved transportation methods have increased dramatically sh accessibility
everywhere. If our intuition is correct, it would help understand why we observe that people
living in a given country or belonging to a given group tend to have similar preferences.
It should be noted that this availability could be the result of either endowments or
technology. In our earlier example, sh could be easily accesible in a particular area because
sh stocks were extremely abundant and even a rudimentary shing technology yields a large
production. In this case, sh availability for consumption would be due to the endowment.
Alternatively, a more rened shing technology could yield the same production from far less
plentiful stocks. In this case it would be due to technology. In either case, the product of
labor could be the same and, to the extent that this is the case, the two alternatives would be
indistinguishable. Hence, it is the interaction of endowments and technology what, in our view,
shapes preferences.
As far as technology is concerned, there is a budding empirical literature dealing with the
technology-to-preferences line of causation. Alesina et al. (2010) provide a nice example: they
uncover a link between historic plough use and current self expressed attitudes about the role
of women in society. Their argument is that plough use increased the productivity of males
2Some tastes, e.g., bitter taste, are asociated with natural poisons, e.g., hemlock, so it is natural that avoiding
those tastes became favored by natural selection. However, the learning process may well trump that innate taste
and help develop an apreciation for tonic water or, at least, for gin and tonic.
3Fish consumtion data are from 2007, retrieved from FAOSTAT. Coastline length and land area by country
were obtained from The CIA Factbook.
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relative to that of females and that induced men to specialize in market production while
women specialized in home production. In turn, this specialization gave rise to beliefs and
attitudes that have persisted until the present and manifest themselves in, for example, lower
female labor force participation among rst and second generation immigrants to the US from
countries that historically used the plough.4 Ross (2008) describes the case of oil producing
countries and suggests that it is the fact that the oil producing technology crowds out women
from the labor market what reinforces the prevalence of patriarchal norms and values. These two
papers underscore the role of technology in shaping individual preferences, which are then shown
to exhibit a signicant correlation with, among other things, female labor market participation
rate.5
Our paper focuses on the determination of labor market participation rate in a model in
which preferences are shaped by a culture whose evolution is driven by technology.6 We build
a simple OLG model that captures the evolving nature of culture. Every (two period lived)
generation will be identical except for the culture they inherit from the previous generation. For
a given generation, the current state of culture and the economic decisions of the individuals
given prevailing wages will determine their labor market participation rate in the second period
of their lives. In the steady state, the labor market participation rate will be determined by the
marginal product of labor (our technological parameter).
For each generation, as the labor market participation rate depends on the quit rate, the
received culture will a¤ect wages o¤ered by rms (see e.g., Oi, 1962). Hence, we will have
reciprocal causation between labor market participation rate and expected present value of
wages. Note that we refrain from talking about wages and use instead the more cumbersome
expected present value of wages expression. This is because, although perfect competition
among rms guarantees that the expected present value of labor costs must equal the expected
present value of the marginal product of the workers, it has no direct implication on the particular
value of the wages paid at every point in time. Therefore, some additional assumption regarding
how each period wage is xed is needed to close the model. Contract theory provides the natural
option: we impose that rms o¤er whichever wage schedule is preferred by individuals.7
4Boserup (1970) is credited by Alesina et al. (2010) as the origin of the idea that it is the historic mode of
agricultural production what shaped, at least in part, gender role attitudes.
5A related literature is that of papers dealing with the impact of external events on preferences. Examples are,
Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) or Guiso et al. (2008). Nunn and Wantchekon
(2011) trace back mistrust to the likelihood of ancestors being subject to slave trade. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln
(2007) document the impact of Comunism on East Germans preferences. Guiso et al. (2007) relate di¤erences in
social capital between the North and South of Italy to the free city states experience in the North of Italy at the
turn of the rst millennium.
6We understand that culture need not be neutral with respect to technological change, and that, to some
extent, changes in economic fundamentals may be driven by culture itself. However, we will concentrate in the
economics to culture direction of causality.
7Some papers have indeed pursued this line of thought (e.g., Lazear and Rosen, 1990), but they have always
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Our model, thus, integrates both contract theory and the role of culture in an OLG model to
shed some light on the labor market participation decision. In this sense, our paper is related to
Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002), Escriche et al. (2004) and Escriche (2007). In these papers, authors
embed cultural transmission of values à la Bisin and Verdier (2001) and asymmetric information
in an OLG framework. The main di¤erence between our approach and theirs is that they all
take as given the existence of several subcultures, each characterized by specic preferences, and
focus on determining their equilibrium distribution, i.e., the proportion of individuals having
each of those preferences. These papers, thus, feature an endogenous distribution of preferences
but specic preferences themselves are una¤ected by economic factors. In contrast, our agents
are ex ante identical and it is only changes in the economic fundamentals what would give rise
to the appearance of these di¤erentiated groups.
In some sense, hence, it could be argued that our model rationalizes heterogeneous prefer-
ences: to the extent that individual preferences can be the product of other economic fundamen-
tals, heterogeneity in preferences would simply reect variation in the relevant fundamentals.
For example, one could account for the male-female labor market participation gap as the result
of past di¤erences in productivity, as described in Alesina et al. (2010). In fact, heterogeneous
preferences can arise from any factor that impacted the relevant technological parameter. For
example, we would expect individuals living in areas in which property rights enforcement is
limited to work shorter hours. This, in turn, might lead to more negative attitudes towards work.
In this vein, the di¤erence in hours worked across countries could be understood as taxation
originating the preference for leisure that some (e.g. Blanchard, 2004) suggest as an explanation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model for consumers and rms.
Section 3 describes the equilibrium conditions. Section 4 analyzes some implications of the
model and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Consumers
Each generation is formed by a continuum of individuals (indexed by i) of measure 1 who live
for two periods, say t and t + 1; and are endowed with one indivisible unit of labor time per
period. Individuals derive utility from current and future consumption and from future leisure
according to a time separable utility function
Ui (ct; ct+1; Lt+1) = u (ct) + u (ct+1) + i (1  Lt+1)
conned themselves to the static (or one generation) case.
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where ct; ct+1 2 R+ denote time t and time t + 1 consumption levels, Lt+1 2 f0; 1g indicates
labor time,  is a subjective discount factor and i is the marginal valuation of time, which
is unveriable in the asymmetric information sense. This implies not only that markets are
incomplete, but also that they cannot be completed. Since individuals do not value current
leisure, they inelastically supply their endowment time to the labor market when young. At
times it will be convenient to indicate whether we are referring to the generation an individual
belongs to; in those cases, the superscripts t and t+ 1 will be used, but, otherwise, they will be
dropped to enhance readability. We assume further that u () is di¤erentiable, strictly increasing
and strictly concave, that all derivatives have constant sign over the entire domain and that the
usual Inada conditions apply. We also assume that the absolute risk aversion, as measured by
the Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient, is non increasing in income for u ().
Individuals do value leisure in the second period of their lives, but only learn about their
marginal valuation of leisure at the onset of that second period. The idea behind this specication
is that, as the evidence cited by Bowles (1998) indicates, preferences are commonly formed as
a result of the previous consumption experience. In our case, for preferences for leisure to
develop, the individual must rst experience work, which she does when young. This working
experience allows her to develop a taste for leisure (or a distaste for work), upon which she will
subsequently choose whether to work or not when old. Before working, individuals are only
aware of the common (to all individuals) distribution function of leisure valuation. In particular
the known distribution of i is as follows, let qt+1 be the probability with which an individual
born at time t receives i = 0 (we will refer to qt+1 as the unconditional probability of working),
and F () the conditional cdf of  for i > 0: We assume that F () is twice continuously
di¤erentiable and its density, f () ; is strictly positive and non-increasing. The unconditional
probability of working can be understood as reecting the prevailing attitudes towards work and
leisure, and, in this sense, as reecting the impact of culture on labor market participation. From
the point of view of each generation, this unconditional probability of working is given because
the culture in which they are bred is heavily inuenced by that of the previous generation.
Hence, consumers born at time t only learn about their particular marginal valuation of
leisure before time t + 1 consumption and leisure or work takes place. This specication of
uncertainty implies that all individuals are ex-ante (as of time t) homogeneous and ex-post (as
of time t + 1) heterogeneous and is akin to the one used in Lazear and Rosen (1990), whose
workers only receive information about their reservation wage just before deciding whether to
work or not. At the time of hiring, therefore, an individual has no more information about
her characteristics than her potential employers and this makes the problem one of genuine
uncertainty rather than one of asymmetric information. However, as there is no law of large
numbersapplicable in the context of a continuum of agents (see Feldman and Gilles, 1985), this
individual uncertainty translates into aggregate uncertainty which we would like to avoid. We,
thus, take the approach in Alós Ferrer (2002) whereby individual uncertainty is specied so that
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it disappears in the course of aggregation. This specication removes aggregate uncertainty at
the cost of losing independence between individuals, but this is immaterial in our model, because
it only implies that the index i is correlated with the realization i: In so far as the index itself
is not observable, this is irrelevant.
Consider an individual born at time t: On the rst period of her life, the individual is
assumed to work, and will receive a wage of wt that will be devoted to current consumption,
ct; and to savings, st; which will earn interest Rt+1. The decision on whether to work in the
next period hinges upon the actual realization of the i parameter she receives. At time t + 1
she will choose between staying employed, which allows consumption ct+1 = stRt+1 + wt+1; or
quitting her job, in which case her consumption will be of only ct+1 = stRt+1 but she will receive
i in additional utility from leisure. It is clear that she will remain employed if and only if
i < bt+1 = u (ct+1)   u  ct+1 ; a critical value that is decreasing in savings and increasing in
the wage received when old. Therefore, the probability with which an individual born at time t
will work at time t+ 1, will be, thus,
(1) pt+1 = qt+1 + (1  qt+1)F
bt+1 :
It is important to note that our previous assumptions on the distribution of i have a number
of implications. First, the probability of working will be always strictly below one. Second,
the Inada conditions together with 0 < pt+1 < 1 imply non-negative savings. And third, pt+1
coincides with the proportion of old individuals that will work at time t + 1: Culture, thus,
determines a base labor market participation rate,qt+1; whose inuence is combined with that
of economic factors to yield the actual labor market participation rate, pt+1:8
The problem for the consumer is, thus, to choose st to maximize her expected utility of
current and future consumption and of (contingent) future leisure, subject to her budget con-
straints, i.e., ct + st = wt and ct+1 = stRt+1 + wt+1Lt+1, and taking into account that the
individual chooses Lt+1 = 1 if and only if i < bt+1: The objective function of the individual
can be written as
Ef(i) [Ui (ct; ct+1; Lt+1)]
= qt [u (ct) + u (ct+1)] + (1  qt)
Z 1
0
fu (ct) +  [u (ct+1) + i (1  Lt+1)]g f (i) di
= u (ct) + Ept+1 [u (ct+1)] +  (1  qt)
Z 1
bt+1 f (i) di(2)
= u (ct) + Ept+1 [u (ct+1)] + (1  pt+1)Ef(i)
h
i
i > bt+1 i ;(3)
where E [] and E [ j ] are the expectation and the conditional expectation operators respectively
and the subindex indicates the probability under which the expectation is taken. The FOC can
8The time t+ 1 labor market participation rate is actually 1+pt+1
2
:
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be shown to be the usual
(4)  u0 (ct) + Ept+1

u0 (ct+1)Rt+1

= 0:
To understand the disappearance of terms connected to leisure, observe that as the probability
of working increases the individual gives up utility of leisure in exchange for utility from con-
sumption. At the margin, the added probability of working, reduces the utility from leisure in
exactly its critical value, i.e., bt+1; also at the margin, the gain in utility from consumption is
u (ct+1)  u
 
ct+1

. This two values are identical, and, hence, it is as if savings had no e¤ect on
the utility of leisure.9
Note that the Inada conditions imply that the LHS of (4) is (large) positive for values of
st close to 0 and (large) negative for values close to wt; which together with its continuity
guarantees existence of optimal savings. However, the e¤ect on the LHS of (4) of an increase
in savings is unclear because, in addition to the usual negative e¤ect on the expected marginal
utility of consumption, there is also a positive indirect e¤ect that operates through the increase
in the probability of working, as can be seen in
@2Ef(i) [Ui (ct; ct+1; Lt+1)]
(@st)
2 = u
00 (ct) + Ept+1

u00 (ct+1)R2t+1

+
@pt+1
@bt+1
 
@bt+1
@st
!2
:
To guarantee that a unique solution to this problem exists, we provide a natural extension
of the traditional denition of normal goodto our uncertain environment: we characterize a
good as generalized normalif an increase in current wealth leads to an increase in its expected
consumption.10
Proposition 1 If time t + 1 leisure is a generalized normal good as dened, optimal savings
are uniquely determined. In addition, they are non decreasing in wt and non increasing in
wt+1.
Proof The expected time t+ 1 leisure is E [1  Lt+1] = 1  pt+1; and the above denition of a
generalized of normal good implies that
@E [1  Lt+1]
@wt
=  @pt+1
@st
@st
@wt
> 0:
As the probability of working has been shown to decrease with savings, it must be the
case that @st@wt > 0: The only way an individual can increase the expected amount of leisure
9From an analytical standpoint, this is more easily seen taking the derivative of (2) with respect to st; rather
than that of (3) :
10The following proposition can be viewed as an extension of the classical result in Diamond (1965).
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she will experience is through the reduction of the probability of working, and this is
accomplished by increasing the savings level. Note that this assumption does not imply
necessarily that time t+1 consumption is also a normal good because, although the increase
in savings will lead to an increase in ct+1 irrespective of whether the individual works or
not at t+1; it will also shift the probability towards the low consumption state and, hence,
the net e¤ect on the expected future consumption is unclear.
Implicit di¤erentiation of the FOC yields
dst
dwt
=
u00 (ct)
@2Ef(i)
[Ui(ct;ct+1;Lt+1)]
(@st)
2
;
which has been shown to be positive. As the numerator is negative, this implies a negative
denominator. This ensures that a unique strictly positive solution to (4) exists, and optimal
savings bsjt = S (wt; wt+1; rt+1; qt+1) are well dened. The amount saved depends, thus, on
the wages paid at t and t+1 and on the prevailing interest rate between these two periods.
We have already shown dS(wt;wt+1;Rt+1)dwt > 0; and to establish the sign of
dS(wt;wt+1;Rt+1)
dwt+1
;
we calculate
@2Ef(i) [Ui (ct; ct+1; Lt+1)]
@st@wt+1
= Ept+1

u00 (ct+1)Rt+1

+
@pt+1
@wt+1
@bt+1
@st
< 0
i.e., consumers react to a higher future wage by reducing savings and, thus, increasing the
probability of working.
2.2 Firms
We assume that there is perfect competition among a continuum rms, who share a common
technology displaying constant returns to scale. As rms are assumed to be able to hire as
much capital as they want at a constant cost r; they choose a xed capital per worker ratio,
which, in turn, determines that output per worker is constant. Of course, if output per worker,
capital per worker and the cost of capital are all constant, the marginal product of labor will
also be constant, and will be denoted w: In addition, nancial arbitrage implies that the rate
of return on savings, Rt+1; must coincide with the cost of capital r: We also impose that all
workers are equally productive, irrespective of their age or type, and that rms face a one-time
cost when hiring a new worker. This cost is borne when hiring irrespective of the age of the
worker, and, therefore, if an old worker wanted to work for any rm other than the one that
hired her when young, the new rm would have to pay this cost. We assume this cost, ; to be
constant, although results are qualitatively una¤ected if it is proportional to the wage.
Denote Pt+1 the proportion of old individuals willing to work at the prevailing wage; as
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already noted, our previous assumptions on the distribution of i imply that Pt+1 = pt+1;11
and, hence, Pt+1 = P (st; wt+1) : We assume that rms do not face any uncertainty with respect
to the measure of workers that will choose to stay on the job when old. To guarantee this, in
view of the aforementioned inexistence of a law of large numbers for a continuum of agents, we
impose that each rm hires a countably innite number of workers. This assumption warrants
that the ex-ante probability of working that each individual faces coincides with the ex-post
proportion of old-age agents that choose to work not only for the overall economy but also at
the rm level. In addition, for each young worker the rm employs at time t, it will also be able
to employ Pt+1 old workers at time t+ 1.12
Competition among rms ensures that rms make zero prots. For prots to be zero, the
present value of the expected worklife labor cost of each worker type must coincide with the
present value of her expected worklife output,
(5) wtt + + w
t
t+1
Pt+1
r
= w

1 +
Pt+1
r

:
In addition, wtt0 is bounded below
(6) wtt0  w   ; t0 = ft; t+ 1g ;
i.e., no wage rate can fall below the w    threshold. Imagine wtt < w   ; this would make
young workers too cheapand a rm that only hired these workers (and red them when old)
would be able to make positive prots. The fact that old workers always receive at least w   
is what warrants that they have no incentive to change rms when old and justies our previous
claim that rms face no uncertainty about the number of old workers it can employ. Of course,
if the rm could credibly commit itself to time t + 1 wages for old workers, wages for young
workers could fall short of w   : Even in this case, however, the lower bound for the wage of
old workers would be binding. To summarize, then, the contract space we are considering is the
set of all wage pairs that satisfy (5) and (6) simultaneously. Clearly, the zero prots condition
(5) only places a restriction on the present value of the wages paid to a worker, but not on
the time distribution of this amount, i.e., not on the particular values of wt and wt+1: The
lower bounds for wages in (6) reduce further the set of admissible wage pairs. We argue that
competition among rms leads them to o¤er whichever distribution is most desirable for workers,
i.e., competition forces rms to choose wt; wt+1 so that individuals maximize their utility among
those wage pairs for which prots are zero and are above the lower bound, i.e.,
(7) fwt; wt+1g 2 argmax f(3) s:t: (5) ; (6)g
11This is tantamount to assuming that rms compute Pt+1 under the assumption that the continuum of indi-
viduals behave as would a representative (measure one) individual.
12For this statement to be accurate, we need that those individuals willing to work when old have no incentives
to accept o¤ers from other employers. We will see below that the conditions under which this is true are implied
by the zero prots condition.
11
This condition is akin to the incentive compatibility constraints commonly found in the
asymmetric information literature. However, it is worth stressing that in our setting it arises as
a consequence of competition among rms, and not as a restriction on the problem of the rm.
There is an interesting specic case: when wt = w    and wt+1 = w; i.e., every worker is
paid her current marginal product net of current hiring costs. We label this contract the age
contract.Under this contract, rms obtain the same prots from hiring any worker, irrespective
of her age. Furthermore, wages do not depend on the quit rate. In all other contracts, however,
wages and quit rates are jointly determined.
In all, competition among rms has three e¤ects. First, rms make zero prots (5) : Second,
all wages must be above a given threshold (6) : And third, within the limits imposed by the
previous two conditions, the time distribution of wages is the one preferred by workers (7).
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Equilibrium within a generation
Consider the generation born at time t and recall that members of this cohort take qt+1 as given.
We study rst the case where qt+1 = q;8t. For this generation, an equilibrium is a manifold that
includes the savings decision, the probability of working and the wage rates, i.e., equations (4) ;
(1) ; and (7) ; must be satised simultaneously. Let RA (ct) denote the Arrow-Pratt measure
of absolute risk aversion, and m = u (w (1 + r)  )   u (rw) : Proposition 2 establishes the
existence of the equilibrium for such an economy.
Proposition 2 If
(2:i) f (m) M ,13 and
(2:ii) time t+ 1 leisure is a generalized normal good
then there exists a unique, stable equilibrium for the economy.
Condition (2:i) imposes a limit on the probability mass in the right tail (beyond some
point m) of the distribution of i:
Proof We give here a sketch of the proof and defer the formal proof to Appendix A.114. We
treat the problem in two separate parts. First, by substituting (1) in (4), (5) and (7), we
13M is a positive real number whose precise denition is given in Appendix A.1.
14 In the Appendix, we ommit most technical details for the sake of brevity. Detailed proof is available from the
authors.
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construct the following value function, which is well dened given st :
V (st) = maxfwt;wt+1g
u (ct) + Ept+1 [u (ct+1)] + (1  pt+1)Ef()
h
i
i > bt+1 i
s:t: (5) ; (6) ; and wt   st  0
Under the assumptions, both the objective function and the restrictions are quasi-concave,
and given that a solution to this problem exists and that the constraint qualication is
met everywhere, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and su¢ cient to characterize
the unique solution to the problem, fw (st) ; pt+1 (st)g ; with w (st) = fwt; wt+1g. Note
that the inverse function theorem ensures that this solution is di¤erentiable with respect
to st. Second, we construct an auxiliary function g (st; w (st)) that is simply the rst order
condition of the problem of the individual when wages are such that solve the problem of the
rm, and show that it has at least one zero. Let s (wt; wt+1) be such that g (s; w (s)) = 0.
Then, s denes an equilibrium for the economy. Note that, in principle, any feasible
contract can be an equilibrium contract, i.e., equilibrium considerations do not limit further
available contracts. This implies that the equilibrium contract can be, but need not be
the age contract. Finally, we ensure that irrespective of the equilibrium contract, this
equilibrium is unique.
3.1.1 Equilibrium wage schedules
The presence of the seniority payments in the labor market is pervasive. However, the age
contract is the maximally back loaded wage scheme i.e., the one that implies the largest di¤erence
between young and adult wages (or the highest seniority payments). We are interested in
determining under what conditions individuals prefer wage schedules involving a less steep wage
schedule. Therefore, we nd conditions on the primitives of our model that guarantee that the
contract prevailing in equilibrium is not the age contract. If this is the case, as we have already
noted, wage rates will be dependent on the quit rate.
Consider a wage schedule consisting in equal payments in both periods, i.e., wtt = w
t
t+1;
and label it constant wage schedule. We will prove that, under some conditions, it is strictly
preferred to the age contract and that this preference is robust in the space of parameters for
which proposition 2 holds.15 Obviously, if a constant wage schedule is preferred to the age
contract, this constant wage schedule may or may not be the equilibrium contract but we are
certain that the equilibrium contract will be distinct from the age contract. Let ;W; r > 0
denote the minimum values ;w; and r can take, also let s = S (w   ;w), and observe that s will
be the minimum savings for given parameter values. Our initial parameter space is, then b 
15This preference will, hence, be shown to be robust with respect to a particular u (c). We take this to be given
from the outset, since the range of the cdf, the density and the elasticities are dependent on its functional form,
as well as on w
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[; 1)[0; 1](0; 1]W;1[r;1)R++; with typical element b = (; q; ; w; r; f (m)) ;where
m = u (w (1 + r)  ) u (rw) : Also note that, given the denition of the parameter space and
the consumer problem, we can obtain infb2bs = s > 0, which can be taken as a parameter, as
it is independent of the specic values of the other parameters. Hence, we take our enlarged
parameter space as  = b R++, with typical element  =  ; q; ; w; r; f (m) ; RA  rs :
Proposition 3 Let  () be the Lebesgue measure on  and, given  2 ; wt () =

wt ; wt+1
	
be the unique equilibrium wage schedule for the generation born at time t. Then, there
exists I   such that  (I) > 0 and for all  2 I, wt () 6= fw   ;wg.
Proof We o¤er a formal proof in Appendix A.2 that proceeds along the following lines: We rst
construct a constant wagecontract, i.e., one in which wtt = w
t
t+1 that satises (5) and
(6) ; and show that, for small values of ; it is preferred to the age contract. As (7) has to
be satised in equilibrium, this implies that the prevailing wage scheme will be di¤erent
from the age contract.
In words, this implies that there is an open set of parameters for which the equilibrium
of the economy will imply a wage schedule other than the age contract. An economic
rationale for this is that, in presence of hiring costs, the constant wage contract provides
some insurance against the eventuality of not working when old, because consumers receive
higher income (compared to the age contract) when young (i.e., when they are sure to
work), and, hence, are better able to smooth their consumption levels.
3.2 Steady state equilibrium
We have already mentioned that the unconditional probability of working reects the impact of
culture on labor market participation. In particular, we posit that individuals observe the quit
behavior of the previous generation and derive from it some assessment of the acceptabilityof
quitting. On the other hand, it is already clear that the received culture is not the only relevant
factor, because the economic environment is also crucial in the labor market participation rate
determination. The inherited unconditional probability of working, together with the economic
environment the individuals face, translates into their actual behavior regarding quits, i.e., the
actual probability of working is determined according to (1) : The fact that individuals do not
simply work (or quit) with their inherited probability, but change it to account for economic
factors is key, because it causes culture to evolve through time in response to these economic
factors. We have, thus, that the current value of economic variables is heavily inuenced by
culture, but that, at the same time, it is economic fundamentals that shape culture in the long
run. We introduce, thus, a process that governs the evolution of qt through time. Let
qt+1 =  (qt; pt) : [0; 1]
2 ! [0; 1]
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be the law of motion (which we assume to be common knowledge) for the unconditional proba-
bility of working. Therefore, qt+1 can be viewed as the result of cultural inuences received by
the individual. Knowledge of past values of the unconditional probability of working (the past
acceptability of quitting) and of the actual proportion of old age workers helps determining how
acceptable it is to quit. The higher these values, the least acceptable should be this behavior
and, hence, the higher the base labor market participation rate, qt+1: As a consequence, the law
of motion should be increasing in both qt and pt: In addition, and to guarantee that the steady
state equilibrium is unique and stable, we will assume that  (qt; pt) is continuously di¤erentiable
and that its partial derivatives are bounded above by  ; a positive real number which will be
dened in Appendix A.2. Finally, as qt+1 is a probability, we impose that
(8) 1 >  (qt; pt) > 0;8 (qt; pt) 2 [0; 1]2
The assumed law of motion for qt embodies the idea that preferences are partly transmitted
across generations. However, this transmission can take on several forms and steams from dif-
ferent sources, from which three are especially relevant. First, there is transmission of cultural
values within the family, and it can be explicit (i.e., intended by the individual parents) or im-
plicit (i.e., derived from the repeated exposition of the individual as a child to certain situations,
from which endogenous modications of tastes arise). Moreover, both types of intra family
transmission interact, as the individual can observe as a child their parents actual behavior and
contrast it to the values explicitly transmitted. Second, individuals are embedded in a broader
social framework, e.g. the neighborhood, the school or the institutional and legal framework of
the country they live in. This represents a constraint on their actions and an external (to the
family) source of interaction, and sets another channel for preference formation. Finally, the in-
dividual as a child can observe directly the actual economic behavior of the previous generation
as a group and this observation can also impact the preference generation mechanism.
Our modelization of the process is exible enough to accommodate as particular cases some
of the usual theoretical approaches on preference formation. For example, in Fernández (2007),
individuals receive from the previous generation a prior with respect to the disutility of work and
update that prior based on some private signal. In our model, qt would be the inherited prior,
while the fact that parents did work or not could constitute the private signal. Cultural trans-
mission by aspirations, à la de la Croix (1996), can be incorporated rather simply by choosing
 (qt 1; pt 1) = qt 1+(1  )pt 1 where  describes the degree of aspiration with respect to
the past generation explicit norms and  stands for the degree of aspiration with respect to the
past generation actual economic behavior. It is worth noting that, in models of aspirations, the
utility the younger generation obtains from consumption in the rst period of their lives usually
depends on the consumption experience of the previous generation when young. In our model,
it is the distribution of the marginal valuation of leisure what is endogenous and determines the
probability of working and the expected consumption of leisure. Of course, to the extent that
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this probability is inuenced by the behavior of the previous generation, aspirations are reected
in it. And, because the probability of working is involved, these aspirations also have an impact
on the utility derived from the consumption of other goods.
Irrespective of what the particular preference transmission mechanism is, we want to ensure
that a unique steady state exists in this economy, and that is the purpose of the next proposition.
Proposition 4 If
(4:i) @RA(ct)@ct  0; 8ct;
(4:ii) f (m) M.16
(4:iii) time t+ 1 leisure is a generalized normal good
(4:iv) qt+1 =  (qt; pt) : [0; 1]
2 ! [0; 1] is continuously di¤erentiable, with positive partial
derivatives bounded above by  and (8) ;
then there exists a unique steady state equilibrium for the economy, with qt = q 2 (0; 1),
8t. This equilibrium is globally stable, in the sense that, for any initial value of (q0; p0)
the economy will converge to that unique steady state. Moreover, the steady state value
of the unconditional probability of working is increasing in w:
Proof As before, we give a sketch of the proof and refer the reader to Appendix A.3. First,
given qt 2 [0; 1], we can apply the proof of proposition 2 to obtain a unique solution
to the problem of the generation born at time t   1. Note that part of this solution is
pt = qt+(1  qt)F
bt , which allows us to write it as pt = pt (qt) . Hence, for generation
born at time t, it is clear that qt is the only relevant state variable, and we can write
qt+1 =  (qt; pt (qt)) =  (qt)
and note that our previous arguments imply that the solution is di¤erentiable with respect
to the state variable qt. Thus, we can obtain an expression for the di¤erential
dqt+1
dqt
=
d (qt)
dqt
=
@ (qt; pt)
@qt
+
@ (qt; pt)
@pt
dpt
dqt
:
This, together with the denition of dptdqt , which can be obtained from the solution to the
problem of the generation born at time t, and assumption (4:iv) above, ensure that the
total e¤ect on qt+1 is less than proportional to the change in qt so that for all (qt 1; pt 1) 2
[0; 1]2 :
sup
qt;2[0;1]
dqt+1dqt
 = sup
qt;2[0;1]
d (qt)dqt
 = sup
qt;2[0;1]
@ (qt; pt)@qt + @ (qt; pt)@pt dptdqt
 < 1:
Hence  (qt) is a contraction on a complete metric space, and there exists a unique xed
point qt+1 =  (qt+1) 2 (0; 1).
16M is a positive real number whose specic denition is given in Appendix A.3.
16
4 Implications
How can our model help explain the observed di¤erences in labor market participation rates
across groups dened e.g., by gender or by nationality? To the extent that pt is the product not
only of current economic conditions but also of the inherited culture, qt; all factors determining
qt are relevant in the explanation of the present labor market participation rate. Notably, past
values of the marginal product of labor will be shaping current attitudes towards work provided
that the economy is not in a steady state: Imagine a world in which, individuals belonged to one
of two distinguishable groups, call them Beesand Drones. Suppose that, initially, both the
marginal product of labor and the distribution of the marginal valuation of leisure was identical
across the two groups. Assume that an exogenous technological innovation causes the marginal
product of Bees to increase while that of Drones remains constant, wB > wD. This could be
what happened with the introduction of the plough, as Alesina et al. (2010) suggest: the superior
strength needed to handle the plough increased male productivity, but left female productivity
unchanged. Assume also that the prevailing wage scheme is not the one associated with the age
contract. As shown in Proposition 3 above, this will be the case at least for small values of . In
such a world, the unconditional probability of working of each group would converge to di¤erent
values, qB > qD. Hence, economic factors would give rise a cultural artifact that associates
group membership with labor market attachment. In turn, this larger labor market attachment
would imply a larger expected present value of wages for Bees than for Drones.
From this standpoint
 
wB > wD; qB > qD

suppose now that some exogenous innovation
caused the marginal product of Drones to increase and equal that of Bees, à la Galor and Weil
(1996). Clearly, we would observe a transition phase during which both the expected present
value of wages and the unconditional probability of working of Drones converge to the same
values Bees experience. During this transition the expected present value of wages would be
lower for Drones than for Bees even though they are equally productive, and we would observe a
wage gap between them17. This wage gap would arise between groups of groups di¤ering only in
the culture they have inherited from the previous generation, and bears no relation whatsoever
to education, productivity or any of the usual determinants of wage.
Frequently any di¤erence between wages of distinguishable groups (e.g., male vs. female, or
black or Mexican vs. white) that can not be ascribed to these usual determinantsis attributed
to pure discrimination. Our model suggests that this need not be the case: di¤erences in wages
may arise as a result of pure cultural (as opposed to economic) factors, and, to the extent that
they are not included in the analysis, discrimination estimates might be biased upwards. In this
vein, Erosa, et al. (2005) show that the better part of the unexplained wage di¤erential between
17Actually, we would observe a lifetime expected wage gap because it is the expected present value of wages
what would be lower for drones than for bees. As the equilibrium wage schedule has not been determined, we
make no claims about the existence of wage gaps between wages at each point in time.
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men and women vanishes when one considers only women with no children. In our context,
this would merely imply that women without children face cultural restrictions with respect to
quitting similar to those men do.
Our model can also be brought to bear on the issue of cross country di¤erences in labor
market hours worked. There is broad consensus in this literature about the crucial role taxes
play in explaining these di¤erences (see Prescott, 2004), but explanations stressing di¤erences
in preferences over consumption/leisure choices are not uncommon (e.g. Blanchard, 2004). We
suggest what could be viewed as a consensual alternative between the two previous explanations.
Imagine two identical countries, both in steady state equilibrium. Being identical, all variables,
e.g., wages or the unconditional probability of working, would take the exact same values. Now
suppose one country introduces some form of taxation and spends the proceeds in a manner
that those taxed also reap the benets of spending. There is a wedge, however, between taxes
paid and services received, perhaps due to collection costs. This wedge is what will be crucial.
As a consequence of the wedge, individuals will work less, and this will generate a departure in
the culture of the high tax country from that of the low tax country: on average, leisure will be
more highly valued in the high tax country. Thus, we would observe that individuals work less
in countries with higher taxes (or more precisely, with higher ine¢ ciency in their tax collection
mechanisms). This lower number of individuals working would be a consequence of both, taxes
and the pro leisure culture that taxes would induce.
In addition, the model can also be use for policy evaluation: For example, Alesina et al.
(2007) raised the issue of gender based taxation, essentially on e¢ cient taxation grounds. They
contend that, given the di¤erent labor supply elasticities of male and female workers, marginal
tax rates should be di¤erent for this two groups in order to satisfy the Ramsey criterion. They
argue that as a by product of achieving e¢ ciency, gender based taxation would help close
the gender income gap, because it would induce women (men) to work longer (shorter) hours.
Obviously, the gender wage gap would also reduce on an after tax base, but the gross (pre-tax)
gender wage gap would not be a¤ected.
Our model suggests that such gender based taxation will have implications on quit rates
which, in turn, will impact not only net, but gross wages. These inducedchanges will reinforce
the e¤ect of the di¤erential tax rates, provided the taxed and subsidized populations are chosen
carefully. In particular, a small tax on old working males would, in addition to reducing their net
wages, induce an increase in their quit rate, which, in turn, would further reduce their pre-tax
expected present value of wages. If the proceeds of the tax were distributed among old working
women, their net income would increase; this would cause their quit rate to decrease, and this
lower quit rate would lead to an increase in their pre-tax expected present value of wages. Note
that, although in Alesina et al. (2007) wages themselves are una¤ected, in our model wages
change in response to changes in quit rates. What does change in Alesina et al. (2007) are the
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labor supply elasticities of male and female workers and they suggest that in the event of those
elasticities converging, there would disappear the rationale for a di¤erential tax treatment of
men and women. In a similar vein, our results suggest that gender based taxation can be used
to speed the convergence of quit rates. A formal treatment of this problem can be found in
Appendix A.4.
5 Summary and conclusions
In recent years, we have witnessed a rapid and steady growth in papers dealing with the re-
lationship between culture and economics, and in particular, with the inuence of culture on
preferences. Several strands of this literature can be identied, each of dealing with a particular
aspect of the problem. There are papers that document (but do not attempt to model) changes
in preferences stemming from changes in either the cultural environment or the economic fun-
damentals. There are also papers that emphasize the importance of the cultural background
in explaining di¤erences in behavior, but ignore what caused those diverse preferences. Finally,
and somewhat independently from the previous literature, there is a number of papers dealing
with the mechanism of intergenerational transmission of preferences. We build a model that in-
tegrates all these (to some extent partial) analysis. Individual preferences are shaped by culture,
which, in turn, evolves through time in response to changes in the economic fundamentals.
In particular, and in keeping with a large part of this literature, we analyze the labor market
participation rate, and we do so through the quit to non participation decision. Individuals
may exit the labor force in the second period of their lives (thus determining the labor market
participation rate) and, in taking this decision, they weight their marginal valuation of leisure,
whose distribution reects the inherited culture, against the economic incentives of working. The
comparison is not trivial: as numerous empirical studies have shown, quit rates and wage rates
depend on each other, and the model reects it. In addition, it must be noted that even if the
present value of the product of labor was xed, its time distribution (the wages paid to young
and old members of the same generation) would be not, and we impose that competition among
rms leads them to o¤er whatever wage schedule workers prefer. Hence, at each time, the labor
participation rate, and the wage schedule need to be determined simultaneously. The following
generation observes the behavior with respect to labor market participation of its predecessors
and updates its beliefs about the acceptability of quitting, thus modifying the distribution of the
marginal valuation of leisure, i.e., the culture. This updating is done in a manner compatible with
the mechanisms of intergenerational transmission of preferences most frequent in the literature.
Culture, therefore, evolves through the generations and ends up reecting the current state of
economic fundamentals. In the transition, however, both past and current fundamentals are
relevant in the determination of equilibrium values. This mechanism helps explain why it is
19
possible to observe di¤erences in the present expected value of wages of workers even when they
are equally productive, or why individuals in countries with higher taxes seem to develop a
preference for leisure.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 2. Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
within a generation.
Let qt = q 2 [0; 1] ;8t be given. As we are considering each generation separately, we will only
keep the time subscript to distinguish wages earned when young from those received when old.
In particular, c will denote young age consumption while old age consumption will be either
c or c in the event of working or not working when old respectively, while p will denote the
probability of working when old. Let wmaxt be the maximum wage the rm can o¤er to young
workers when wt+1 is set equal to its minimum value. As optimal savings have been shown
to depend positively on the current wage and negatively on the (expected) future wage, the
maximum amount saved will be s = S (wmaxt ; w   ) ; whereas minimum savings are positive
and given by s = S (w   ;w).
Recall that we dened ;W; r > 0 as the minimum values ;w; and r can take. Our
initial parameter space is, then b  ; 1  [0; 1]  (0; 1]  W;1  [r;1)  R++; with
typical element b = (; q; ; w; r; f (m)) ; where m = u (w (1 + r)  )   u (rw)18: Let M
denote the normalized value of the upper bound of the density function at m; whose precise
value will be given later. Also note that, given the denition of the parameter space and the
consumer problem, we can obtain inf
2
s = s > 0, which can be taken as a parameter, as it can
always be computed and is independent of the values of the other parameters.19 Also, we can
dene maximum probability p = q+(1  q)F  u  w + rs  u  rs Hence, we take our enlarged
parameter space as  = b  R++, with typical element  =  ; q; ; w; r; f (m) ; RA  rs :
Finally, let  = u
 
w + rs
 u  rs be the maximum value that b can attain (that this is indeed
a maximum can be seen from the denition of s given above and the fact that b is decreasing in
s). Before stating the proof, let us highlight that condition (ii) holds true, for example, for any
rescaled exponential density, say f () = J1e J2; J1; J2 > 0, where both parameters are chosen
appropriately.
The strategy of the proof is based on solving rst a problem that determines the rms
optimal wage o¤er under equilibrium conditions, for every given possible individual choice of
savings. Then, we proceed to nd that choice of savings that is a best response to itself in the
sense that it is the optimal choice for the individual when presented with wages given precisely
by the optimal wage o¤er of the rm for that savings level. That savings level determines an
18Since b = u (c)   u (c) is increasing in wt+1 and decreasing in st , the minimum value it can achieve in the
set 
(s) dened below is M . Moreover, since
@f()
@
< 0, by assumption, any upper bound for f(M ) is also an
upper bound for f() in the set 
(s)
19This can be seen by noting that for the case  = ;w = W; r = r; q = 0; f(M ) = 0; s is still dened by the
FOC of the consumer and is strictly positive.
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equilibrium.
The proof is organized in several steps, that are numbered to enhance readability:
1. We determine the optimal solution for the rm in equilibrium
(a) Since the equilibrium level savings should allow rms to make non-negative prof-
its, pay wages above the given thresholds and individuals to obtain strictly positive
consumption when young, we compute the maximum savings bs0 for which this is
possible.
(b) For each possible 0 < s < bs0, we dene an ancillary problem, V (s), that characterizes
the rms optimizing behaviour in any equilibrium. This problem consists in taking as
given the individual savings and choosing the optimal wage schedule that maximizes
the individual utility subject to obtaining non-negative prots and satisfying the lower
bounds for both wages.
2. We dene g (s) as the FOC of the individual when wages are given by w (s). Observe that
a zero of g (s) completely characterizes optimizing behaviour by the individual when rms
optimize in equilibrium. Therefore, we dene an equilibrium as that level of savings, s,
such that g (s) = 0,. We prove that s exists and that it must satisfy s  s  s:
3. To guarantee uniqueness, we ensure that g (s) is decreasing around s for any s 2 (s; s) :
(a) We write the condition dg(s
)
ds < 0 as an inequality of the form A > f
bB:
(b) We specify an upper bound on f (m) involving only primitives that guarantees that
g (s) is decreasing around s. Since the assumptions guarantee that the primitives
satisfy such a uniform upper bound, this completes the proof.
A.1.1 Firms optimal behaviour in equilibrium
1.a It is clear that if rms take savings as exogenous, they cannot achieve non negative prots
for all savings levels, because the non negativity of consumption in the rst period requires that
wt  s: We need to determine that upper bound. Imagine rms o¤ered wt+1 = w   , the
lowest possible amount. This would enable them to pay wmaxt , the largest possible amount in t
(because s is given) that produces zero prots. Obviously, the largest savings compatible with
this would be bs0 = wmaxt and this value is determined by :
a (bs0) = w q + (1  q)F (u (w   + bs0r)  u (bs0r))
r

  (bs0 + ) = 0:
Note that the existence of bs0 is guaranteed by the fact that the above function is monotonic
in s. Moreover, note that such bs0 could never be optimal for the individual, since her rst
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period marginal utility of consumption would be innite. Hence, since s = S (wmaxt ; w   ) is
the optimal response of the individual when facing the wage schedule (wmaxt ; w   ) , it follows
that s < bs0.
1.b Given s 2 (0; bs0), let
V (s) = max
fwt;wt+1g2A
Ef(i) [Ui (ct; ct+1; Lt+1)]
s:t: 
w
 
1 + pr
  wt     wt+1 pr  0 (1)(9)
(wt   w +   0) (2)(10)
(wt+1   w +   0) (3)(11)
(wt   s  0) (4)(12)
be the problem whose solution gives the optimal behaviour of the rm in equilibrium, where
A = (0;+1) (0; w + 1) is open and i denote the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker multipliers. It
can be shown that V (s) is well dened, has a unique solution completely characterized by the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions provided
(13) 
F (m)

(w   )RA (w (1 + r)) =M1 > f (m) :
A.1.2 Equilibrium savings: existence
Now, in order to ensure that the individual chooses s through maximizing behavior, we construct
the following function
g (s) =  u0 (wt (s)  s) + r

pu0 (wt+1 (s) + sr) + (1  p)u0 (sr)

:
which is simply the FOC of the consumer evaluated at s when wages are given by w (s) Under
the assumptions, lim
s!0+
g (s) = +1, lim
s!bs0g (s) =  1, (since lims!bs0wt (s) = s) and the continuity of
g (s) ensures that there exists s 2 (0; bs0) such that g (s) = 0. Note that such s determines
an equilibrium for this economy, as dened in the proposition. Moreover, s 2 [s; s]. To see
it, recall that s being an equilibrium implies that it is an optimal response of the consumer
to w (s), that is s = S (wt (s) ; wt+1 (s)) and w (s) being a solution to V (s) implies that
(w   )  wt (s)  wmaxt ; (w   )  wt+1 (s)  w . Then, since S (wt; wt+1) has been shown
to be increasing in wt. and decreasing in wt+1, we have that s = S ((w   ) ; w)  s =
S (wt (s
) ; wt+1 (s))  s = S (wmaxt ; (w   )).
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A.1.3 Equilibrium savings: uniqueness
3.a In order to ensure the uniqueness of this equilibrium, it is enough to show that for any s
in the open interval (s; s), dg(s
)
ds < 0. Note that for any such s
, (10) ; (11) and (12) must not
be binding (so that 2 = 3 = 4 = 0 ) while (9) must hold with equality. This can be seen
as follows: as shown above, (9) must hold with equality and (12) is an strict inequality at any
solution of the V (s) problem. For (10), note that if wt = (w   ) ; (9) implies that wt+1 = w,
which is precluded by the fact that we are considering s > s = S ((w   ) ; w). An analogous
argument shows that s is the only potential steady state savings where (11) holds with equality.
Hence, (11) must not be binding at any s < s. It can be shown that w (s) is a continuously
di¤erentiable function around any equilibrium savings, s.
Let c = wt   s; c = wt+1 + sr, c = sr and write
dg (s)
ds
=  u00 (c)

dwt (s
)
ds
  1

+ r (1  q) f
b"@b
@s
+ u
0
(c)
dwt+1 (s
)
ds
#
@b
@s
1
r
(14)
+r

pu
00
(c)

dwt+1 (s
)
ds
+ r

+ (1  p)u00 (c) r

:
We want to show that g (s) is decreasing around s, and we will prove the following stronger
condition20
(15)
dg (s)
ds
  r2 (1  p)u00 (c) < 0:
Changes in savings can be shown to a¤ect optimal wages as follows
dwt+1
ds

s=s
=
u00 (c) b (1 + rb)
C1 + b2u00 (c)
  rC2 + u
00 (c) rb2
C1 + b2u00 (c)
 u
00 (c) br (w   wt+1) (1  q) [u0 (c)  u0 (c)]
C1 + b2u00 (c)
f
b
= W1 +W2 +W3f
b ;
where b = 1r
h
(w   wt+1) (1  q) f
bu0 (c)  pi ; C1 and C2 are given by
C1 = pu
00 (c) + (1  q)f
b  u0 (c)2
+(1  q) 1
r
n
(w   wt+1)
h
f 0
bu0 (c)2 + f bu00 (c)i  2f bu0 (c)o
C2 = pu
00 (c) + (1  q)f
b @b
@s
1
r
u0 (c)
+ (1  q) 1
r
(
(w   wt+1)
"
f 0
b @b
@s
1
r
u0 (c) + f
bu00 (c)#  f b @b
@s
1
r
)
;
20This condition will be useful in Appendix A.3
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and the denitions of Wi are obvious from the expression above. Note that W1;W3 < 0 and
that both are bounded21. Let cW1 = inf
2
W1; and cW3 = inf
2
W3: Also
dwt
ds

s=s
=  brC2   u
00 (c) b2
C1 + b2u00 (c)
+
C1 (w   wt+1) (1  q) @b@s 1r
C1 + b2u00 (c)
f
b
= A1 +A2f
b
where, again, the denitions of Ai are obvious. Note that A2 < 0: Using these values, we can
now write dg(s
)
ds as
dg (s)
ds
= u
00
(c) [1 A1] + r2
h
pu
00
(c) + (1  p)u00 (c)
i
+ r [W1 +W2] pu
00
(c)
+f
b
8<:(1  q)
 
@b
@s
!2
+ r [W1 +W2] (1  q) @
b
@s
u
0
(c)(16)
+W3r
"
pu
00
(c) + (1  q) @
b
@s
u
0
(c)
#
  u00 (c)A2
)
:
Expression (15) can be written, using (16), as
  u00 (c) [1 A1]  r2pu00 (c)  r [W1 +W2] pu00 (c) >
f
b
8<:(1  q)r2
 
@b
@s
!2
+ r [W1 +W2] (1  q) @
b
@s
u
0
(c)
+ rW3
"
pu
00
(c) + (1  q) @
b
@s
u
0
(c)
#
  u00 (c)A2
)
:
3.b It can be shown that the LHS of (??) is positive and
 u00 (c) [1 A1]  r2pu00 (c)  r [W1 +W2] pu00 (c) >  u
00
(c) [1  p]2
1 + 1r
RA(rs)
RA(w(1+r))
:
Therefore, (??) would follow if either the RHS is negative or if it is positive and
 u00 (c) [1  p]2
1 + 1r
RA(rs)
RA(w(1+r))
>(17)
f
br (1  q)
8<:r
 
@b
@s
!2
+ [W1 +W2]
@b
@s
u
0
(c)
+W3
"
pu
00
(c)
(1  q) +
@b
@s
u
0
(c)
#
  u
00
(c)A2
r (1  q)
)
;
21 It is easily seen that these bounds involve only parameters.
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Now, dividing both sides of (17) by u
0
(c), dividing and multiplying @b@s by b and using the
denition of absolute risk aversion, we can rewrite it as
264 1
1 + 1r
RA(rs)
RA(w(1+r))
375 RA (c) [1  p]2
C3
> f
b ;
where
C3 = (1  q)r2
(b2RA ( ew + sr)2
u0 (c)
  [W1 +W2] u
0
(c)
u0 (c)
bRA ( ew + sr)
 W3u
0
(c)
u0 (c)

p
(1  q) rRA (c
) + bRA ( ew + sr)+ RA (c)A2
r2 (1  q)
)
Now, note that:
i) since c < c < w (1 + r) , we have that u
0
(c)
u0 (c)
< 1 and u
0
(w(1+r))
u0 (c)
< 1.
ii) It can be shown that  r [W1 +W2] <  r [W1   r] <  r
hcW1   ri and, by the deni-
tions given above, we have  W3 <  cW3
iii) The term RA (c)A2 is negative.
iv) m is a lower bound for any equilibrium b:
v)  is the maximum value that b can attain.
vi) By the denition of s given above, for any ew 2 (0; wt+1) ; s such that g (s) = 0; we have
RA ( ew + rs) < RA (rs) < RA  rs <1 .
Thus, using the appropriate (either the largest or smallest) values for all these variables in
C3, results in
C3 = RA
 
rs

(1  q)r2

2
u0 (w (1 + r))
RA
 
rs
  hcW1   ri cW3  1
(1  q) r + 1

being the largest possible value C3 can take. Hence, a su¢ cient, but not necessary, condition
for (17) to hold is
(18)
264 1
1 +
h
1
r
i
RA(rs)
RA(w(1+r))
375"RA (c) [1  p]2
C3
#
=M2 > f (m) :
Note thatM2 does not depend on any endogenous object. Now we can deneM = min [M1;M2] :
Since assumption (ii) guarantees that (13) and (18) hold, this completes the proof.22
22Note that for the case q = 1, we obtain pt = 1. In that case the problem is reduced to one without uncertainty,
and thus our basic assumptions on the utility function ensure the uniquenness of the result.
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A.2 Proof of proposition 3: Equilibrium wages
We will prove the proposition for any given (q0; p0) 2 [0; 1]2. First, let us consider a slightly
enlarged parameter space, allowing  = 0. Also, let  = f 2 R7+ :  is such that Proposition
2 holdsg; with typical element  =  ; q; ; w; r; f (m) ; RA  rs. Also, let  z denote the
projection of  in all of the coordinates except for parameter z, with typical element  z We
will be interested in the projection  . In order to prove the proposition, we will show that
for an open set of parameters, there is always a contract and a corresponding savings level,
satisfying the consumer FOC, the zero prot condition, as well as the lower bound for both
period wages, such that the individual prefers it to the age contract.
Consider the contract paying the same wage in both periods (and call it the constant
contract), denoted by w (). Let s (w ()) be the corresponding savings level chosen by the
individual, and hence satisfying FOC. Note that both depend on the set of parameters chosen,
. It can be shown that, for  ! 0 there is a unique value w () > w    that implies zero
prots when consumers choose their savings level optimally.
Now, let us denote 4U (;  ) the di¤erence between the utility level attained with the
constant contract and that obtained under the age contract when the individual chooses savings
optimally. Note that, since w () ; and s (w ()) are continuously di¤erentiable with respect to
 for all   2  , 4U (;  ) is continuously di¤erentiable in . We will be done if we can
show that there exists 0 < e such that, for all  2 Ie = (0; e), 4U (;  ) > 0: This would
imply that the age contract is not optimal because deviating towards the constant contract
would improve individual welfare without violating any of the requirements, and therefore, the
age contract would not be chosen for any  2 I = Ie  :
First, it is clear that
 = 0 =)
8>>>><>>>>:
4U (;  ) = 0
w () = w
s (w ()) = s (w;w) = s
p (w () ; s (w ())) = p (w; s) = p
:
Also, since s > 0 solves the consumer problem, it also satises the rst order condition
u0 (w   s) = pru0 (w + rs) + (1  p)ru0 (rs)
and this implies that
u0 (w   s) > ru0 (w + rs) :
Taking the derivative of 4U (;  ) with respect to , using the rst order conditions from the
consumer problem as well as the implicit di¤erentiation of the equilibrium savings with respect
to  and evaluating at  = 0 it can be shown that:
@ 4 U ( = 0;  )
@
= u0 (w   s) > 0 8  2  :
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Since @4U(=0; )@ is continuous, there exists e > 0 and Ie = (0; e) such that:
@ 4 U (e;  )
@
> 0; 8 (;  ) 2 I = Ie  , with  (I) > 0:
This implies that, by doing a Taylor expansion at ( = 0;  ):
8 (;  ) 2 I; 4 U (;  ) = 4U (0;  ) + @ 4 U (;  )
@
 > 0
for some  2 (0; ) : This completes the proof.
The economic rationale for this result is that, given w, and no hiring costs, an increase in the
hiring costs will only decrease the present wage in the age contract while diminishing both the
present and expected future wage in the constant wage contract. Hence, savings will decrease
in the age contract. In the constant contract, however, there are two opposite e¤ects whose
total sign is unclear. Thus, given a su¢ ciently high risk aversion and variance of the density
function of the marginal valuation of leisure, savings in the constant wage contract will react
less, allowing a smother consumption path.
Analogously, it can be shown that the proposition is non trivial. The economic reason for
this result is that, given relatively high hiring costs, if w increases starting from zero, the net
increase in the second period wage with the age contract more than compensates for the loss
of wage in the rst period, and, at the same time, increases the probability of working in the
second period. Here, the fact that savings cannot react too much because of the non negativity
constraint plays a crucial role. Details are available from the authors.
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A.3 Proof of proposition 4. Existence and stability of the steady state equi-
librium.
First, note that, given qt 2 [0; 1] proposition 2 ensures that there exists a set of parameter values,
dependent on the value of qt such that there is a unique solution for the problem of generation
t. Now, we want to strengthen that condition so that the parameter values do not depend
on the particular value taken by qt. Since qt does not appear in the denition of the other
parameters, from the proof of proposition 2, such restriction can be accomplished by dening
dynamic restrictions as follows. Recall that (13) and (18) dene the values of the upper bounds
for f
b. First note that qt does not appear in the denition of M1. Let:
M1; = inf
qt2[0;1]
M1 =M1 > 0
M2; = inf
qt2[0;1]
M2 > 0
M = min [M1 ;M

2 ] > 0:
The strict positivity of M2 is ensured by the denition of  (qt; pt) together with the denition
of W1;W2 and 1 A1 (see Appendix A.1). Also in Appendix A.1 the conditions for g (st) to be
decreasing around st were established.
Hence, the denition of M together with assumptions (4:i), (4:ii) and (4:iii) ensure that,
given qt 2 [0; 1], we can apply the proof of proposition 2 to obtain a unique solution to the
problem of the generation born at time t   1. Note that part of this solution is pt = qt +
(1  qt)F
bt , which allows us to write it as pt = pt (qt) . Hence, for generation born at time
t, it is clear that qt is the only relevant state variable, and we can write
qt+1 =  (qt; pt (qt)) =  (qt)
and note that our previous arguments imply that the solution is di¤erentiable with respect to
the state variable qt. Thus, we can obtain an expression for the di¤erential
dqt+1
dqt
=
d (qt)
dqt
=
@ (qt; pt)
@qt
+
@ (qt; pt)
@pt
dpt
dqt
:
If we can prove that, for all (qt 1; pt 1) 2 [0; 1]2 ; dptdqt ;
@(qt;pt)
@qt
; @(qt;pt)@pt are such that
sup
qt2[0;1]
dqt+1dqt
 = sup
qt2[0;1]
d (qt)dqt
 = sup
qt2[0;1]
@ (qt; pt)@qt + @ (qt; pt)@pt dptdqt
 < 1
then  (qt) is a contraction, and by the contraction mapping theorem, it has a unique xed point
qt =  (qt+1) = q.23 Moreover, assumption (iv) guarantees that such xed point is in (0; 1) and
we will be done.
23See Stokey and Lucas (1989), p. 50.
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Given  = (q0; ; f (m) ; ; w; ; r; RA (0)) 2  =

 2 R8+
	
, let qt =  (q 1; p 1) be known,
and yt = (wt; wt+1; st; 1;t; 2;t; 3;t; 4;t) be the set of endogenous variables. In order to obtain
an expression for dptdqt , let us recall the denition of pt+1:
pt+1 = qt+1 + (1  qt+1)F (u (wt+1 + rst)  u (rst)) :
Hence,
dpt+1
dqt+1
= 1  F
bt+1+ (1  qt+1) f bt+1"u0 (ct+1) dwt+1
dqt+1
+
@bt+1
@st
dst
dqt+1
#
:
This value can be shown to be continuous in qt+1 2 [0; 1]. By the extreme value theorem, there
exists
M3 = sup
qt+12[0;1]
dpt+1dqt+1
 > 0:
Finally, let M4 = max [M3; 1] ; dene
 =
1
3M4
;
and note that assumption (iv), allows us to place bounds on the derivatives of 
sup
qt2[0;1]
@ (qt)@qt
 ; sup
qt2[0;1]
@ (qt)@pt
  13M4 :
This implies that
sup
qt2[0;1]
d (qt)dqt
  sup
qt2[0;1]
@ (qt)@qt
+ sup
qt2[0;1]
@ (qt)@pt
 dptdqt
  13 + 13M4
dptdqt
 < 1;
which completes the proof.
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A.4 Policy assessment: gender based taxation
Let B stand for man and D for woman. Dene the gross wage gap as the di¤erence in
their expected present value of pre-tax wages and the net wage gapas the di¤erence in the
expected present value of their net labor income: Assume that the economy is in a interior
stationary steady state characterized by men having a larger marginal product of labor and, as a
consequence, a larger unconditional probability of working
 
wB > wD; qB > qD

: As mentioned
earlier, a technological change that increases the marginal product of women so that it equals
that of men would induce a transition phase during which both the expected present value of
wages and the unconditional probability of working of women converge to men values. During
this transition, the expected present value of wages would be lower for women than for men even
though they are equally productive.
Should the government want to speed the transition, it could engage in a budget balanced
policy consisting in a lump sum payroll tax on old working men and distributing the proceeds
among old working women. Note that, as the tax revenue depends on the market participation
rate of old men, the subsidy each women receives is also dependent on it. Therefore, such a
tax scheme links two markets that initially were independent of each other, or more precisely,
makes the outcomes in the market for female workers to be dependent on the equilibrium values
in the market for male workers. It should also be underscored that, as this policy modies the
stationary value of qj ; it needs to be dynamically adjusted, and eventually eliminated. Otherwise
it would lead to a new stationary steady state in which the unconditional probability of working
of women was larger than that of men. An indicator of the gap between the two groups is simply
qBt   qDt : We argue that this di¤erence decreases faster with the aforementioned policy.
As we are assuming that the government maintains its budget balanced at every time t; the
amount of the subsidy an individual receives is determined at each time by the tax revenue and
the participation rates of both groups. Let T t = fTt0g10 denote a tax scheme where Tt0+1 is the
tax faced by the generation born at time t0, for all t0  t but is 0 for all generations born at time
t0 > t. Let qjt+1
 
T t

denote the unconditional probability of working of type j individuals born
at time t given that the previous generations have paid the taxes implied by tax scheme T t.
Recall that qBt (0) > q
D
t (0) ;8t 2 N, i.e., there exists a positive gap between the unconditional
probability of working of both groups when there is no tax. Finally, let qj (T ) denote the unique
steady state value of type j individuals unconditional probability of working if every generation
had faced a xed tax T:
Proposition 5 If:
(5:i) the conditions for the existence of a steady state (Proposition 4) hold
(5:ii)  is such that the equilibrium wages depend on the unconditional probability of working
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for all t
then there exists T > 0 such that a budget balanced government policy consisting of a
at rate tax scheme
 
T t

on type B working old and a subsidy of
Tt+1wBt+1P
B
t+1
PDt+1
to type D
working old, will cause both the lifetime gross and net wage gap to shrink. In addition,
unconditional probabilities of working would converge faster in the sense that
@
 
qBt+1
 
T t
  qDt+1  T t
@T t

T t=0
< 0;
for all t and 0 < Tt < T
Proof First, let  be small but strictly positive. In order to prove the claim, we rst construct
the problem of type B and D individuals, as well as the problem of the rm. Since we
impose a payroll tax Tt+1 on type-B individuals that decide to work when old, and use
the revenues to subsidize type-D individuals that work when old, the time t constraint is
the same as in the original problem for both individuals while time t + 1 constraints are
now given by cBt+1 = s
B
t r +
 
wBt+1   Tt+1

LBt+1 and c
D
t+1 = s
D
t r +

wDt+1 + Tt+1
PBt+1
PDt+1

LDt+1
where P jt+1 = Ej
h
pjt+1
i
stands for the expectation across type j agents born at time t.
Hence, the previous denitions of cjt ; c
j
t ; c
j
t are modied accordingly. When making their
decisions, both individual agents and rms take Tt+1 and q
j
t+1 as given with respect to
their actions.
As in Appendix A.1, let us dene the problem of the rm and note that in this case, rms
face an additional constraint, given when facing type B individuals:
wBt+1 + s
B
t r   Tt+1  0
 
B5;t

:
To ensure that under our assumptions, the new problem of the rm is well dened, and
has a unique solution, we restrict Tt 2 [0; w   ], for all t; so that the new constraint is
never binding and we can eliminate it from the problem. Denote by V j

sjt ; q
j
t+1; T
t+1

the problem of the rm when facing individual of type j and by 
j

sjt ; q
j
t+1; T
t+1

its
constraint set, j = B;D As in Appendix A.1 and A.2, our assumptions ensure that the
rm problem is well dened and has a solution. Moreover, by a reasoning analogous to
that of previous appendices, the individual utility is strictly quasiconcave in wages, it has
non-zero gradient, and the problem satises the constraint qualication at any solution.
Hence, for a given triplet

sjt ; q
j
t+1; T
t+1

, the unique solution is totally characterized by
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. On the other hand, our assumptions also guarantee that
given

T t+1; qjt+1

the FOC of the individual agent problem has a unique solution. Note
that a change in T t+1 will have two e¤ects: rst it will a¤ect the transition for each
generation t and, second it will a¤ect the steady state value of both quit rates. Dene now
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the lifetime gross wage gap,
wBt + wt+1
pBt+1
r
  wDt   wDt+1
pDt+1
r
= w
 
pBt+1
r
  p
D
t+1
r
!
;
by the zero prots condition. Also, recall that qj (T ) denote the stationary value of qj
when all generations face a tax of amount T .
By di¤erentiating the system of equations that denes the equilibrium for a given gen-
eration, and evaluating at the equilibrium, it can be shown that the following conditions
hold
i)
dpBt+1
dT t+1

T t+1=f0g10
< 0;
dpDt+1
dT t+1

T t+1=f0g10
> 0
ii)
dqBt+2
dT t+1

T t+1=f0g10
< 0;
dqDt+2
dT t+1

T t+1=f0g10
> 0
iii)
dpjt+1
dqjt+1

T t+1=f0g10
> 0
iv) dq
B(T )
dT

T=0
< 0; dq
D(T )
dT

T=0
> 0:
Taken together, these inequalities imply the result.
Although the intuition behind this result is straightforward, it is worth noting that the
proof is not trivial, because of the endogenous nature of contracts. Take the contract of men:
anticipating the tax men will face when old, rms will adjust the wage scheme o¤ered to diminish
its impact on the worker welfare. In particular rms will o¤er a lower wage to young men and
a higher one to old workers, because this lessens the impact of the tax, as it shifts income from
the lowto the highmarginal valuation of consumption period of the life of the worker. This
could lead men to increase their likelihood of working when old. Proposition 5 shows that this
is not the case, and men end up with a reduced probability of working.
36
